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1. Introduction	
Since the mid-1980s, the notion of private participation in infrastructure (PPI) has 
attracted considerable discourse in Western countries, but the discussions have tended to 
be polarized, and both advocates and opponents of private sector involvement in the 
provision of public services have voiced their opinions (Ghere 2001; Grimshaw, Vincent, 
and Willmott 2001). Despite the controversies over PPI, the United Nations and the 
European Commission have promoted and fostered it as an instrument for development, 
especially in countries whose public budgets cannot support substantial expenditures 
(see, for example, Chang, Memon, and Imura 2003).  
The links between infrastructure and development include the impact of 
infrastructure on poverty alleviation, equity, growth, and specific development outcomes 
such as job creation, market access, health, and education (Straub 2008; Calderόn and 
Servén 2004, 2008, 2010). These relationships are complex and dynamic; even with 
respect to growth and job creation, infrastructure’s effects are felt through multiple 
channels.i  
On the one hand, the demand for infrastructure is rising with the accelerating pace 
of globalization and urbanization. Every month in the developing world, more than five 
million people migrate to urban areas. This trend is compounded by the growing need for 
climate-resilient investments to combat the challenges of climate change (Fay and Toman 
2010; Bhattacharya and Romani 2013). On the other hand, however, as a result of the 
fiscal constraints caused by the onset of the global financial crisis, government budgets—
traditionally the major source of financing for infrastructure—cannot alone be expected 
to finance the infrastructure needs in emerging markets and developing economies 
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(EMDEs). Yet the volume of private participation in financing infrastructure projects in 
EMDEs remains modest with respect to OECD countries.  
While private sector financial commitments to infrastructure projects have risen to 
about US$181 billion per year in EMDEs, this is less than 20 percent of the overall 
current infrastructure investment in these economies. There has been an important 
increase in private participation in infrastructure financing (PPI) over the last two 
decades.ii Annual commitmentsiii to PPI projects have increased from USD22 billion in 
1990 to USD181 billion in 2012 (see Figure 1). Most of this growth since 2000 has been 
mainly in the energy and transport sectors (see Figure 2) decreasing the importance of 
telecoms. 
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Figure 1: Private Investment in Infrastructure in Low and 
Middle Income Countries
New Investment Additional Investment Number of Projects
2012 billions USD*
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. * Adjusted by US CPI
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There are a number of current and emerging challenges that are expected to 
undermine the attractiveness of long-term private investments such as furthering 
infrastructure. The weakness in and deleveraging of commercial banks and the regulatory 
constraints such as Basel III is likely to persist into the medium term, which implies a 
growing mismatch between the time horizon of available capital and that of productive 
long-term investment projects (World Bank 2013). 
Even under more normal credit conditions, the costs and risks faced by private 
investors in infrastructure are high, particularly in EMDEs, where economic and financial 
conditions tend to be weaker and less stable. Another critical and overarching pre-
condition to attract private investors is an enabling institutional framework, including 
peace and stability, the rule of law, good governance with accountability and 
transparency, the absence of corruption, clear property rights, and enforceable contracts.  
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Figure 2: Private Investment in Infrastructure in Low and 
Middle Income Countries, by Sector
Energy Telecom Transport Water and sewerage Number of Projects
2012 US$  billions*
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. * Adjusted by US CPI
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From a public policy perspective, given the positive economic, social, and 
environmental externalities that quality infrastructure can provide, efforts to lower the 
overall riskiness of infrastructure investments and enhance the availability of efficient 
risk-sharing instruments can have important implications in efficiency and distribution. 
At the same time, there is a need to ensure that efforts to encourage private sector 
participation in infrastructure offer optimal benefits but do not impose an inappropriate 
burden on the public sector.  
Against this background, this paper reviews the empirical literature on the 
determinants of private participation in infrastructure investments and presents a more 
detailed discussion of the political, institutional and governance determinants based on 
Moszoro et al. (2014).  It also identifies areas in which additional efforts are required if 
the private sector were to play a larger role in financing infrastructure development in 
EMDEs.  
2. Literature	on	the	Determinants	of	PPI	
There is considerable economic and financial literature attempting to explain the 
determinants of investment and the relationship between investment and risk. Most of the 
theoretical literature points to access to capital, investment efficiency, the social (as 
opposed to the financial) discount rate, operational efficiency, bundling of investment 
and operations, risk allocation, and contract flexibility as the main economic drivers of 
private investment in infrastructure  
The empirical literature is focused on foreign direct investment rather than 
infrastructure investments, and most of the works utilize cross-country specifications. For 
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example, Chakrabarti (2001) concludes that market size is a robust determinant of FDI, 
and Nunnenkamp (2002) identifies exchange rate, openness, growth rate, and trade 
balance as determinants of overall investment levels.  
The literature on infrastructure investments and risk is thinner. Araya et al. (2013) 
analyses the relationship between private participation in infrastructure and country risk. 
They show that a difference of one standard deviation in a country's sovereign risk score 
is associated with a 27 percent increase in the probability of having private participation 
in infrastructure commitment and a 41 percent higher level of investment in dollar terms 
with the energy sector (among infrastructure sectors) and concessions (among contractual 
types). They also show that conflict-affected countries typically require six to seven years 
to attract significant levels or forms of private investments in infrastructure from the day 
that the conflict is officially resolved. Private investments in sectors in which assets are 
more difficult to secure—such as water, power distribution, or roads—are slower to 
appear or simply never materialize. 
Hammami et al. (2006) use the World Bank PPI Database to analyze the determinants of 
PPI and conclude that lower levels of corruption and more effective rule of law are 
associated with more Public-Private Partnership projects. This study focuses on capturing 
the effect on the number of projects committed rather than investment levels per se. It 
breaks down the number of projects by sector, but not the levels, leaving room for further 
study, especially if we consider that bigger projects (committing more resources) may be 
more sensitive to the risk of the country. 
The empirical evidence on determinants of PPI uses a cross-country panel 
regression approach, looking at whether indicators of macroeconomic stability, measures 
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of institutional and regulatory quality, and a variety of other controls impact the total 
amount of PPI received by a country. For example, there are papers that concentrate in 
specific regions such as Pragal (2003) and Kirpatrick et al. (2006). These papers look at 
the importance of the regulatory framework as a determinant of PPI respectively for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the broader set of developing countries. Pragal 
(2003) finds that the most significant determinant of PPI is the passage of legislation 
liberalizing the investment regime, while Kirpatrick et al. (2006) find that institutional 
framework and regulation matter most. A study by Tewodaj (2013) analyse the 
determinants of private participation in infrastructure comparing Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) with low and middle income countries (LMICs). The study finds that PPI 
investments in LMICs seem to be, in principle, determined by the expected factors (i.e., 
larger, open, more developed democracies with lower tax burden and more stable 
macroeconomic environment receive more PPI), PPI into SSA countries is—from a 
social planner’s perspective—sub-optimally allocated.  
There are sector studies such as Jensen et al. (2005) that looks at the water and 
sanitation sector and Gasmi et al. (2010) that look at the power sector. Jensen et al. 
(2005) analyses the institutional determinants of private sector participation in the water 
and sanitation sector in 60 developing countries. The regression results provide support 
for the hypotheses that PPI is greater in larger markets where the ability to pay is higher 
and where governments are fiscally constrained. The protection of property rights and the 
quality of the bureaucracy emerge as the most important institutions that encourage PPI. 
Gasmi et al. (2010) assess the extent the level of development of financial sector is a 
determinant of private investment in the power sector in 37 developing countries. The 
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results suggest that investors tend to take countries’ governance quality into account in 
their decisions to invest. The empirical results highlight that the development of the 
financial sector also plays a significant role in private investors’ decisions to enter 
infrastructure sectors.  
There are a few paper in the literature that cover the basic infrastructure sectors 
(energy, water, transport and telecoms) in the developing world. In particular, when it 
comes to larger PPI investments the findings suggest that corrupt countries with 
inefficient governments seem to be associated with more PPI in infrastructure. Banerjee 
et al. (2006) using a sample of 40 developing countries over the period 1990-2000, look 
at the question of whether institutions matter for PPI. While their results indicate that 
property rights and bureaucratic quality play a significant role in promoting PPI, they find 
that countries with higher levels of corruption are associated with more PPI. Basilio 
(2011) using a sample of 72 developing countries shows that the market size and 
purchasing power are critical determinants of infrastructure flows. The institutional 
quality matters mostly for the decision to invest in emerging countries, but it is less 
important with regard to the intensity of the investment than financial and economic 
conditions.  
Using those previous studies as a starting point, Moszoro et al. (2014) contribute 
to the literature by (i) disentangling the relevant institutional, political, and governance 
determinants of country risk at a granular level through providing a theoretical 
framework to derive the testable hypotheses; (ii) using an new empirical approach that to 
account for the fact that data is on discrete observations of commitments;  (iii) using a 
novel dataset on quality of governance and on number of PPI disputesiv that allow to add 
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new variables that were not previously considered due to data limitations; and (iv)  
extending previous analyses with a cross-country panel of 130 developing countries for 
1984-2012 period for transport, energy, telecoms and water sector.v   
3. Results	from	Moszoro	et	al.	(2014)	
Using panel data assembled from the World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure dataset, Quality of Government dataset, UNCTAD Database of Treaty-
based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, and country-level economic variables 
from the World Development Indicators Database, Moszoro et al. (2014) analyzes the 
institutional, political, and governance variables determinants of PPI for 130 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2012. 
The paper explores the intensity of the different determinants given that a country 
has received private investments in infrastructure.  It runs an OLS regression with 
country-fixed effect and year dummies to capture for changes over time that are common 
across countries (e.g., the financial crisis). The model is specified in logarithms and uses 
a moving average of 15 years for water projects, 10 years for energy (plants and 
transmission) projects, 8 years for transport projects, and 5 years for telecom projects—
roughly 1/3 of the depreciation time estimated by the World Bank, i.e., arguably an 
approximation of refurbishing time—to account for the fact that data is on discrete 
observations of commitments.  
log $$%!" = '! + )# log *+$!"$# + )% log $,$!" + )& log *-,./0!"$#
+ )' log %1234/%,1!"$# + )( log,$511566!"$#
+ )) log+57/!"$# + )* log 488566/,2%14185!"$#
+9)+ log :!"+ +	<!" 
( 
1 ) 
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Equation (1) shows that, where log PPIit equals logarithms of the levels of the 
moving average of private investment in infrastructure for country i at the period t. Most 
econometric specifications dealing with GDP and Investments suffer from endogeneity. 
The paper address this problem by assuming that the investments are being affected by 
events of the previous year. GDPit–1 is the Gross Domestic Product purchasing power 
parity in current US millions dollars for the country i in the year t–1. GROWTHit–1 is the 
GDP’s growth and both are expected to have a positive impact on investment levels. 
POPit captures the size of the population  and INFLATIONit–1 captures the monetary 
instability for the country i in the year t–1 and is expected to have a negative impact. 
OPENNESSit–1 is a proxy of the openness of the country calculated as the sum of exports 
and imports over the GDP; ACCESSTOFINANCEit–1 captures the access to commercial 
bank credit for the country i in the year t–1 and is expected to have a positive impact; and 
Xitj are the political and institutional variables including for country i at time t: (a) 
freedom from corruption; (b) government effectiveness; (c) rule of law; (d) quality of 
regulations; and (e) number of court disputes. 
The regression results are presented in Tables 3–7. All specifications control for 
the main characteristics of the economies as commonly used in the previous literature: 
• Size of the market: GDP and population. PPI tends to be more common in 
larger markets where demand is larger. 
• Inflation: PPI is more prevalent in countries with more stable 
macroeconomic conditions. Higher inflation is less attractive for investors as it 
imposes inflation risk premium. 
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• Openness (proxied by trade): more open countries are more likely to 
attract big foreign investors. 
• Debt: countries with higher levels of debt are more likely to require the 
private sector to invest in infrastructure. However, they could be perceived as a 
higher risk of default by the private sector. As a debt measure, the paper uses the total 
debt service divided by the gross national income. 
• Access to finance, i.e., access to commercial bank credit. 
Table 3 presents the results using country-fixed effect and year dummies. In these 
specifications, the overall R-squared is around 50 percent, a high value for a panel data 
model.vi 
The coefficients associated with large markets, stable inflation, access to finance, 
freedom from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and number of disputes, are 
statistically significant indicating that they are relevant channels for the determination of 
investments in PPI. 
Interestingly, the political regimens such as parliamentary democracy, mixed 
(semi-presidential) democracy, presidential democracy, civilian dictatorship, military 
dictatorship, and royal dictatorship do not affect significantly the level of PPI 
infrastructure investment. 
Countries with large markets and high demand for infrastructure (larger 
population and higher lagged GDP) tend to have more PPI. 
Governments with less inflation have a more stable environment fostering private 
sector investments in infrastructure PPI. 
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The higher a country score on freedom from corruption, the higher the average 
level of investments with private participation in infrastructure. Decreasing corruption by 
10 points can increase PPI by 6.7 percent. That is, if a country like Serbia can lower its 
corruption level by 10 points as measured by the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) reaching for example the level of South Africa (which has 
similar GDP per capita), the private sector will invest seven percent more.vii 
The higher a country score on rule of law, the higher the average level of 
investments with private participation in infrastructure. Improving rule of law by one 
standard deviation (i.e., by 0.1) can increase PPI by 4.3 percent. That is, if we consider 
two countries like Buthan and Jordan which have similar GDP per capita,viii Buthan can 
gain four percent increase in infrastructure investments in PPI if the country achieves the 
quality of the environment of property rights and enforceability of contracts that Jordan 
has today as measured by the World Bank worldwide governance indicators project. 
Breach of contract and regulatory issues remain the most important political risk 
concerns for investors into developing economies, according to the annual MIGA-EIU 
Political Risk Survey. Forty-five percent of investors in developing countries named 
breach of contract and 58 percent named adverse regulatory changes as the most 
important political risks they will face in the next three years. Forty percent of the survey 
respondents mentioned that they experienced financial losses through adverse regulatory 
changes and 34 percent through breach of contract over the past three years. Therefore, it 
is not surprising to observe that both quality of regulations and number of previous 
disputes are statistically significant. 
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The model also shows that an improvement of one standard deviation (0.1) in 
quality of regulation produces an average increase of 3.2 percent in the level of 
infrastructure investment in PPI. For example, Mexico can gain three percent increase in 
infrastructure investments in PPI if the country achieves the quality of regulations of a 
country such as Turkey (with similar level of GDPix) as measured by the World Bank 
worldwide governance indicators project. 
On disputes, the estimation indicates that the higher the number of disputes, the 
lower the level of investments. Having one more project going to court decreases 
investments by four percent.x We presumed that the number of disputes could have a 
non-linear effect on private investments (e.g., no disputes could also reflect an 
anticipation of risk and therefore lack of private investments); however adding disputes 
squared was found to be statistically not significant. Unfortunately the variable on time to 
solve a dispute was incomplete for half of the sample, impeding expanding the analysis in 
that area.  
The paper also analyzes difference across sectors, i.e. whether the impacts vary 
among the energy, transport, telecom, and water sectors (see Table 4). Freedom from 
corruption is statistically significant for all sectors except for transport. While corruption 
generally reduces the prospects for investment in all sectors, the lack of sensitivity of the 
transport sector could be explained by the fact that corruption matters primarily regarding 
investors’ decision to enter the transport market, not the subsequent level of investment, 
which may indicate that the investors are protected against such risks once they do invest.  
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Rule of law is statistically significant for overall PPI, but it is not significant at the 
sector level. The coefficients are of almost the same magnitude but not significant due to 
smaller sample size when we run regressions at the sector level. 
Quality of regulation is statistically significant for all sectors except water. 
Regulatory quality includes measures of the incidence of price controls and perceptions 
of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation. Improving the quality of regulations in a 
country can attract more private investors to infrastructure PPI, but since water is a 
socially sensitive sector and very likely to be politically influenced, investors may prefer 
price controls and strong regulation, as they limit ex ante the risk of domestic politics 
around water.xi  
The coefficient on disputes is statistically significant for all sectors except for 
energy. PPI investments in telecoms and water are particularly sensitive to the 
accumulated number of disputes in that particular sector. Having one more dispute can 
decrease PPI investments in those sector by approximately 12 percent.  
The paper also finds that variables of institutional and political regimens such as 
parliamentary democracy, mixed (semi-presidential) democracy, presidential democracy, 
civilian dictatorship, military dictatorship, and royal dictatorship are not statistically 
significant. Results did not change by quartile of experience, GDP, and GDP per capita. 
According to field experts, it is not the quantity, but quality of experience (i.e., successful 
projects) what matters, for which unfortunately data is not available. 
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4. Conclusions	
Fostering private sector investment in infrastructure depends on investors facing 
an appropriate investment climate. Currently private sector investment is a small portion 
of the total infrastructure investment (less than 20 percent). The costs and risks faced by 
investors are high, particularly in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) 
where the economic, institutional, and financial conditions are weaker and less 
predictable. One of the main concerns of private sector investors considering investment 
in infrastructure in EMDEs is the quality of the underlying investment climate.   
A supportive enabling environment reduces the costs and risks of investing in 
infrastructure. Investment climate is affected by many factors, including political 
instability, regime uncertainty, rule of law and property rights, government regulations, 
government transparency, and accountability. The existence of a stable and predictable 
environment in which both domestic and foreign investors can operate is vital for 
providing confidence to investors. 
This paper reviews the empirical literature of the determinants of PPI and 
describes the empirical evidence of the relationship between institutional, political, and 
governance variables and the level of PPI investments in infrastructure in developing 
countries. The existing empirical literature supports the arguments that the enabling 
environment for PPPs is very important to increase the level of PPI investments in 
infrastructure. 
The latest paper by Moszoro et al. (2014) covers all the main infrastructure 
sectors and 130 developing countries. It shows that the intensity of PPI investment in 
infrastructure is highly sensitive to the quality of government variables such as freedom 
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from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and the number of disputes in the 
sector. These results hold when data is disaggregated at the sectoral level. However, 
transport investments are not found to be sensitive to improvements in “freedom from 
corruption,” water investments to improvements in quality of regulations, and energy 
investments to the number of accumulated disputes in the sector. More work needs to be 
done to understand these discrepancies.  Importantly, the evidence does not show any 
significant difference in the results across experience and economic level quartiles. 
These findings support the argument that a sound investment climate is a critical 
factor affecting the supply of private infrastructure investment financing. The challenges 
from upstream “enabling” institutions, policies, and regulations and sector economics 
down to pipeline development need to be addressed simultaneously. Tackling such a 
complex and interconnected agenda requires building the institutional capacity and the 
quality of regulations and governance, as well as, adopting of a holistic approach to 
infrastructure development. 
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Annex	I	
Definition of Variables 
Quality of Government is the mean value of the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) variables “Corruption,” “Law and Order,” and “Bureaucracy Quality,” 
scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government. 
 
Freedom from Corruption relies on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption in 152 countries to 
determine the freedom from corruption scores of countries that are also listed in the Index 
of Economic Freedom. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale, in which a score of 10 
indicates very little corruption, and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government. In 
scoring freedom from corruption, the authors convert each of these raw CPI data to a 0-
100 scale by multiplying the CPI scores by 10. 
 
Government Effectiveness combines into a single grouping responses on the 
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is 
on the “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good 
policies and deliver public goods. 
 
Rule of Law includes several indicators which measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of 
the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in 
developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected. 
This indicator is part of the World Bank worldwide governance indicators project. 
 
Regulatory Quality includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as perceptions of 
the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business 
development. This indicator is part of the World Bank worldwide governance indicators 
project. 
 
Regimen Institutions: The classification contains the following regimes: 
parliamentary democracy, mixed (semi-presidential) democracy, presidential democracy, 
civilian dictatorship, military dictatorship, and royal dictatorship. This classification is 
elaborated by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). 
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Annex II 
Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln GDP_1 7,388 22.76985 2.411881 15.99307 30.33849 
ln Inflation_1 6,588 1.95406 1.402989 -13.4379 10.19474 
ln Trade_1 6,938 4.141784 0.638758 -1.17505 6.13225 
Debt_1 4,242 4.927175 6.766934 0 208.0971 
Growth_1 7,140 2.05112 6.012271 -50.2904 92.58597 
ln Population 8,178 15.33762 2.106291 8.982059 21.01901 
Access to finance 2,291 7.47474 17.92406 0 150 
Free of corruption 2,987 40.07265 23.22481 0 100 
Government effectiveness 2,437 -0.05928 0.997779 -2.45416 2.407654 
Rule of law 2,492 -0.06741 0.993558 -2.67015 2.001923 
Regulatory quality 2,438 -0.06711 0.991987 -2.67544 2.247345 
Gini coefficient 2,710 41.53993 9.80825 20.96 74.33 
Disputes 4,780 0.687657 3.303972 0 65 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation of Independent Variables. 
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ln GDP_1 1.00              
ln Inflatioin_1 0.02 1.00             
ln Trade_1 -0.30 0.02 1.00            
Debt_1 0.01 0.05 0.19 1.00           
Growth_1 0.06 -0.02 0.17 -0.02 1.00          
ln Population 0.80 0.07 -0.48 -0.06 0.03 1.00         
Access to finance 0.28 -0.04 0.06 0.21 -0.06 0.10 1.00        
Free of corruption 0.23 -0.12 0.12 0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.18 1.00       
Government effectiveness 0.42 -0.14 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.26 0.72 1.00      
Rule of law 0.22 -0.14 0.11 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.20 0.72 0.85 1.00     
Regulatory quality 0.31 -0.21 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.66 0.81 0.74 1.00    
Gini coefficient 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 -0.20 -0.12 -0.02 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.25 1.00   
Disputes 0.43 0.02 -0.21 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.11 1.00 
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Main Results 
Table 3: Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure. Dependent Variable: Log of Total 
Private Investments in Infrastructure. Specification with Country Fixed Effects and Year Dummies. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI 
ln GDP_1 0.699*** 0.605*** 0.694*** 0.104 0.103 0.579*** 
 (0.145) (0.152) (0.144) (0.180) (0.208) (0.150) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.0561* -0.0242 -0.0504* -0.0643* -0.0732** -0.0173 
 (0.0305) (0.0309) (0.0302) (0.0331) (0.0368) (0.0305) 
ln Trade_1 0.0736 -0.147 0.141 -0.115 -0.150 -0.0775 
 (0.183) (0.186) (0.182) (0.209) (0.230) (0.184) 
Debt_1 -0.00509 -0.000334 -0.00444 -6.26e-05 -0.00268 -2.83e-05 
 (0.00553) (0.00561) (0.00548) (0.00608) (0.00619) (0.00554) 
Growth_1 -0.0161** -0.00844 -0.0130** 0.00111 -0.00243 -0.00409 
 (0.00643) (0.00669) (0.00641) (0.00745) (0.00840) (0.00668) 
ln Population 2.304*** 1.434** 2.062*** 0.716 0.116 1.189* 
 (0.610) (0.639) (0.607) (0.692) (0.792) (0.633) 
Freedom  from corruption 0.00718* 0.0166*** 0.00669* 0.0110** 0.0161*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00420) (0.00402) (0.00459) (0.00497) (0.00416) 
Government effectiveness 0.0587 -0.107 0.120 -0.109 0.0178 -0.0461 
 (0.178) (0.180) (0.177) (0.201) (0.215) (0.179) 
Rule of law 0.404** 0.279 0.431** 0.463** 0.436** 0.325* 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.178) (0.201) (0.219) (0.177) 
Quality of regulation 0.431*** 0.638*** 0.317** 0.660*** 0.598*** 0.515*** 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.153) (0.173) (0.185) (0.150) 
Access to finance 0.00455** 0.00539*** 0.00355* 0.00205 0.00251 0.00405** 
 (0.00196) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00220) (0.00244) (0.00195) 
Gini coefficient  0.00318   0.00757 -0.000675 
  (0.00967)   (0.0116) (0.00959) 
Disputes (moving sum)   -0.0385*** -0.0378*** -0.0350*** -0.0380*** 
   (0.00908) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00844) 
Dispute time    0.0335 0.0237  
    (0.0223) (0.0227)  
Constant -50.19*** -33.81*** -46.44*** -10.15 -0.475 -29.32** 
 (10.74) (11.57) (10.67) (12.26) (14.47) (11.46) 
       
Observations 1,041 867 1.041 771 651 867 
R-squared 0.487 0.547 0.497 0.528 0.540 0.559 
Number of countries 111 98 111 108 95 98 
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Table 4: Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure by Sector. Dependent Variable: Log of Total Private Investments in Infrastructure by 
Sector. Specification with Country Fixed Effects and Year Dummies. 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES ln_PPI_energy ln_PPI_energy ln_PPI_energy ln_PPI_energy ln_PPI_transport ln_PPI_transport ln_PPI_transport ln_PPI_transport 
ln GDP_1 0.510** 0.415* 0.506** 0.406* 0.518** 0.399 0.567** 0.455* 
  (0.213) (0.229) (0.213) (0.229) (0.257) (0.258) (0.256) (0.258) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.0349 0.00567 -0.0347 0.00601 -0.0840* -0.0377 -0.0754 -0.0299 
  (0.0453) (0.0478) (0.0453) (0.0478) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0497) (0.0497) 
ln Trade_1 -0.0952 -0.286 -0.0910 -0.281 1.337*** 1.323*** 1.374*** 1.367*** 
  (0.268) (0.285) (0.268) (0.285) (0.296) (0.300) (0.295) (0.299) 
Debt_1 0.00177 0.00279 0.00181 0.00282 0.00420 0.0213 0.00510 0.0217 
  (0.00685) (0.00749) (0.00686) (0.00749) (0.0115) (0.0146) (0.0115) (0.0145) 
Growth_1 -0.0162* -0.00894 -0.0158 -0.00822 -0.0586*** -0.0431*** -0.0540*** -0.0389*** 
  (0.00955) (0.0100) (0.00963) (0.0101) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
ln Population -2.214** -3.010*** -2.237** -3.052*** 0.152 -0.818 0.152 -0.785 
  (0.988) (1.070) (0.992) (1.073) (1.229) (1.217) (1.221) (1.211) 
Freedom from  corruption 0.0121** 0.00811 0.0120** 0.00782 0.00217 0.00617 0.00259 0.00688  
(0.00567) (0.00605) (0.00569) (0.00608) (0.00777) (0.00801) (0.00772) (0.00797) 
Government effectiveness -0.218 -0.297 -0.217 -0.298 -0.500* -0.771*** -0.484* -0.753**  
(0.243) (0.260) (0.243) (0.260) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290) (0.293) 
Rule of law -0.115 0.160 -0.112 0.172 0.359 0.176 0.501* 0.326  
(0.252) (0.268) (0.253) (0.269) (0.297) (0.302) (0.301) (0.307) 
Quality of regulation 0.466** 0.460** 0.455** 0.438* 1.081*** 1.500*** 0.995*** 1.415***  
(0.214) (0.224) (0.218) (0.228) (0.236) (0.238) (0.237) (0.239) 
Access to finance 0.00553** 0.00435* 0.00549** 0.00426* 0.0108*** 0.00972*** 0.00984*** 0.00886*** 
  (0.00243) (0.00250) (0.00243) (0.00250) (0.00264) (0.00257) (0.00265) (0.00259) 
Gini coefficient   0.0369**  0.0361**   0.0215  0.0166 
   (0.0144)  (0.0145)   (0.0150)  (0.0150) 
Number of disputes energy sector     -0.00626 -0.0119       
    (0.0208) (0.0210)       
Number of disputes transport sector           -0.0676** -0.0589** 
          (0.0262) (0.0250) 
Constant 27.64 42.96** 28.09 43.92** -17.41 0.429 -18.76 -1.420 
 (17.71) (19.74) (17.79) (19.82) (22.43) (22.64) (22.31) (22.53) 
             
Observations 754 660 754 660 577 512 577 512 
R-squared 0.249 0.280 0.249 0.281 0.275 0.327 0.285 0.335 
Number of countries 87 75 87 75 76 67 76 67 
  
24 
Table 4 (continued): Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure by Sector. Dependent Variable: Log of Total Private Investments in 
Infrastructure by Sector. Specification with Country Fixed Effects and Year Dummies. 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
VARIABLES ln_PPI_telecom ln_PPI_telecom ln_PPI_telecom ln_PPI_telecom ln_PPI_water ln_PPI_water ln_PPI_water ln_PPI_water 
ln GDP_1 0.579*** 0.528*** 0.590*** 0.529*** 0.671*** 0.657** 0.731*** 0.701*** 
  (0.152) (0.173) (0.151) (0.172) (0.250) (0.263) (0.247) (0.259) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.0323 -0.0283 -0.0305 -0.0249 -0.00966 0.00134 0.00749 0.0153 
  (0.0316) (0.0349) (0.0315) (0.0349) (0.0510) (0.0528) (0.0506) (0.0522) 
ln Trade_1 0.161 -0.0617 0.163 -0.0560 1.441*** 1.134*** 1.627*** 1.328*** 
  (0.193) (0.216) (0.192) (0.215) (0.324) (0.337) (0.324) (0.339) 
Debt_1 0.00187 0.00583 0.00278 0.00618 0.0118 0.0255* 0.0120 0.0255* 
  (0.00577) (0.00625) (0.00577) (0.00624) (0.0101) (0.0152) (0.00999) (0.0150) 
Growth_1 0.00335 0.00173 0.00436 0.00334 -0.0251** -0.0211* -0.0189* -0.0141 
  (0.00669) (0.00759) (0.00669) (0.00761) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0116) 
ln Population 2.572*** 1.904** 2.649*** 1.912*** -2.784** -2.941** -2.920** -2.938** 
  (0.653) (0.741) (0.653) (0.740) (1.250) (1.313) (1.232) (1.293) 
Freedom  from corruption 0.0129*** 0.0231*** 0.0129*** 0.0229*** 0.0165** 0.0161** 0.0164** 0.0154*  
(0.00450) (0.00497) (0.00449) (0.00496) (0.00745) (0.00815) (0.00734) (0.00803) 
Government effectiveness -0.294 -0.321 -0.258 -0.277 0.239 0.414 0.324 0.483  
(0.189) (0.205) (0.189) (0.206) (0.338) (0.359) (0.334) (0.355) 
Rule of Law 0.350* 0.276 0.298 0.234 0.296 0.339 0.357 0.395  
(0.192) (0.207) (0.193) (0.208) (0.298) (0.306) (0.294) (0.302) 
Quality of regulation 0.548*** 0.570*** 0.566*** 0.579*** -0.183 -0.208 -0.285 -0.298  
(0.159) (0.170) (0.159) (0.170) (0.231) (0.248) (0.230) (0.246) 
Access to finance 0.00155 0.00237 0.00115 0.00194 0.000438 -0.000832 -4.93e-05 -0.00135 
  (0.00203) (0.00219) (0.00203) (0.00220) (0.00271) (0.00285) (0.00268) (0.00281) 
Gini coefficient   -0.0122  -0.0124   0.0178  0.0205 
   (0.0112)  (0.0112)   (0.0171)  (0.0169) 
Number of disputes             
             
Number of disputes telecom sector     -0.142** -0.141**       
    (0.0614) (0.0689)       
Number of disputes water sector          -0.122*** -0.120*** 
          (0.0399) (0.0406) 
Constant -53.31*** -40.45*** -54.85*** -40.63*** 26.47 30.14 26.43 27.98 
 (11.49) (13.35) (11.48) (13.32) (24.30) (25.63) (23.94) (25.25) 
             
Observations 977 821 977 821 334 308 334 308 
R-squared 0.493 0.492 0.496 0.495 0.452 0.473 0.470 0.490 
Number of countries 106 91 106 91 40 36 40 36 
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Table 5: Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure. Dependent Variable: Log of Total 
Private Investments in Infrastructure. Specification with Country Fixed Effects (No Year Dummies). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI ln_PPI 
ln GDP_1 0.830*** 0.843*** 0.863*** 0.801*** 0.856*** 0.874*** 
  (0.0795) (0.0798) (0.0801) (0.0942) (0.101) (0.0803) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.140*** -0.148*** -0.171*** -0.141*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0287) 
ln Trade_1 0.298* 0.201 0.366** 0.296 0.311 0.273 
  (0.170) (0.178) (0.171) (0.204) (0.228) (0.179) 
Debt_1 0.000734 0.00780 0.00130 0.00493 0.00396 0.00805 
  (0.00562) (0.00581) (0.00560) (0.00635) (0.00643) (0.00579) 
Growth_1 -0.0128** -0.00323 -0.0113* -0.00323 -0.00163 -0.00153 
  (0.00631) (0.00652) (0.00631) (0.00750) (0.00824) (0.00653) 
ln Population 4.337*** 4.466*** 4.401*** 4.245*** 3.999*** 4.569*** 
  (0.497) (0.524) (0.496) (0.590) (0.674) (0.523) 
Freedom  from corruption 0.00720* 0.0159*** 0.00692* 0.0111** 0.0169*** 0.0153***  
(0.00417) (0.00442) (0.00416) (0.00484) (0.00527) (0.00441) 
Government effectiveness 0.197 0.124 0.241 -0.109 0.120 0.171  
(0.182) (0.188) (0.182) (0.210) (0.226) (0.188) 
Rule of law 0.387** 0.267 0.395** 0.408* 0.466** 0.285  
(0.183) (0.187) (0.182) (0.209) (0.227) (0.186) 
Quality of regulation 0.227 0.419*** 0.140 0.465*** 0.388** 0.332**  
(0.153) (0.155) (0.155) (0.178) (0.192) (0.158) 
Access to finance 0.00126 0.00211 0.000943 0.00246 0.00239 0.00174 
  (0.00154) (0.00162) (0.00153) (0.00185) (0.00207) (0.00162) 
Gini coefficient   0.00454   0.00257 0.00139 
   (0.0100)   (0.0120) (0.0101) 
Number of disputes    -0.0256*** -0.0234** -0.0214** -0.0237*** 
    (0.00917) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.00872) 
Dispute time     0.0755*** 0.0653***   
     (0.0226) (0.0230)   
Constant -86.38*** -89.73*** -88.43*** -83.75*** -81.97*** -92.26*** 
 (6.838) (7.458) (6.853) (8.221) (9.777) (7.484) 
         
Observations 1.041 867 1.041 771 651 867 
R-squared 0.446 0.483 0.451 0.458 0.468 0.488 
Number of countries 111 98 111 108 95 98 
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Table 6: Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure by Sector. Dependent Variable: Log 
of Total Private Investments in Infrastructure by Sector. Specification with Country Fixed Effects 
(No Year Dummies). 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES 
ln_PPI_en
ergy 
ln_PPI_en
ergy 
ln_PPI_en
ergy 
ln_PPI_en
ergy 
ln_PPI_tra
nsport 
ln_PPI_tra
nsport 
ln_PPI_tra
nsport 
ln_PPI_tra
nsport 
ln GDP_1 0.625*** 0.688*** 0.624*** 0.685*** 0.515*** 0.556*** 0.532*** 0.569*** 
  (0.111) (0.115) (0.112) (0.115) (0.133) (0.130) (0.133) (0.130) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.130*** -0.116** -0.130*** -0.115** -0.115** -0.0886** -0.117*** -0.0907** 
  (0.0421) (0.0448) (0.0422) (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0449) (0.0450) (0.0448) 
ln Trade_1 0.344 0.232 0.341 0.226 1.500*** 1.489*** 1.516*** 1.505*** 
  (0.244) (0.262) (0.246) (0.264) (0.272) (0.274) (0.271) (0.273) 
Debt_1 0.00716 0.00859 0.00715 0.00859 0.0128 0.0353** 0.0137 0.0360** 
  (0.00703) (0.00767) (0.00704) (0.00767) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0114) (0.0142) 
Growth_1 -0.0116 -0.00905 -0.0116 -0.00920 -0.0491*** -0.0393*** -0.0467*** -0.0375*** 
  (0.00903) (0.00937) (0.00907) (0.00940) (0.0101) (0.00999) (0.0101) (0.0100) 
ln Population 1.395* 1.414* 1.392* 1.403* 0.843 0.816 0.974 0.923 
  (0.771) (0.833) (0.773) (0.836) (0.918) (0.890) (0.917) (0.889) 
Freedom  from 
corruption 0.00996* 0.00747 0.00998* 0.00756 0.00173 0.00551 0.00222 0.00601  
(0.00587) (0.00629) (0.00588) (0.00631) (0.00779) (0.00800) (0.00776) (0.00798) 
Government 
effectiveness 0.00755 -0.0750 0.00752 -0.0744 -0.296 -0.505* -0.263 -0.472  
(0.248) (0.267) (0.248) (0.267) (0.290) (0.291) (0.289) (0.291) 
Rule of law -0.0307 0.164 -0.0314 0.161 0.310 0.0489 0.415 0.150  
(0.260) (0.277) (0.260) (0.277) (0.296) (0.297) (0.298) (0.302) 
Quality of 
regulation 0.125 0.0560 0.128 0.0649 0.888*** 1.296*** 0.808*** 1.226***  
(0.215) (0.226) (0.219) (0.231) (0.232) (0.233) (0.234) (0.236) 
Access to finance 0.000128 0.00139 0.000128 0.00139 0.00368* 0.00496** 0.00327* 0.00456** 
  (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00191) (0.00194) (0.00191) (0.00195) 
Gini coefficient   
0.0520**
*  
0.0524**
*   0.0297**  0.0265* 
   (0.0146)  (0.0147)   (0.0148)  (0.0149) 
Number of 
disputes energy 
sector     0.00178 0.00431       
    (0.0212) (0.0214)       
Number of 
disputes transport 
sector           -0.0579** -0.0452* 
          (0.0262) (0.0248) 
Constant -35.66*** -39.25*** -35.57*** -38.98*** -29.01** -31.27** -31.63** -33.28** 
 (10.97) (12.10) (11.03) (12.18) (13.19) (12.99) (13.19) (13.01) 
             
Observations 754 660 754 660 577 512 577 512 
R-squared 0.170 0.196 0.170 0.196 0.230 0.285 0.238 0.291 
Number of 
countries 87 75 87 75 76 67 76 67 
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Table 6 (continued): Determinants of Private Participation in Infrastructure by Sector. Dependent 
Variable: Log of Total Private Investments in Infrastructure by Sector. Specification with Country 
Fixed Effects (No Year Dummies). 
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
VARIABLES 
ln_PPI_tele
com 
ln_PPI_tele
com 
ln_PPI_tele
com 
ln_PPI_tele
com 
ln_PPI_w
ater 
ln_PPI_w
ater 
ln_PPI_w
ater 
ln_PPI_w
ater 
ln GDP_1 0.860*** 0.872*** 0.870*** 0.878*** 0.474*** 0.519*** 0.485*** 0.529*** 
  (0.0809) (0.0874) (0.0811) (0.0878) (0.122) (0.128) (0.123) (0.129) 
ln Inflation_1 -0.0993*** -0.114*** -0.101*** -0.115*** -0.125** -0.117** -0.126** -0.118** 
  (0.0293) (0.0319) (0.0293) (0.0320) (0.0500) (0.0519) (0.0500) (0.0520) 
ln Trade_1 0.404** 0.295 0.414** 0.304 1.690*** 1.395*** 1.734*** 1.445*** 
  (0.176) (0.200) (0.176) (0.200) (0.284) (0.307) (0.295) (0.318) 
Debt_1 0.00559 0.0114* 0.00631 0.0116* 0.0180* 
0.0407**
* 0.0182* 
0.0412**
* 
  (0.00579) (0.00629) (0.00581) (0.00629) (0.0105) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0156) 
Growth_1 -0.000759 -8.70e-05 -3.02e-05 0.000437 
-
0.0332**
* 
-
0.0289**
* 
-
0.0326**
* 
-
0.0282**
* 
  (0.00645) (0.00717) (0.00647) (0.00721) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0106) 
ln Population 4.505*** 4.383*** 4.629*** 4.449*** 0.187 0.761 0.278 0.896 
  (0.538) (0.607) (0.545) (0.614) (0.932) (0.999) (0.946) (1.024) 
Freedom  
corruption 0.0132*** 0.0235*** 0.0132*** 0.0234*** 0.0174** 0.0149* 0.0175** 0.0147*  
(0.00457) (0.00507) (0.00457) (0.00507) (0.00777) (0.00850) (0.00778) (0.00852) 
Government 
effectiveness -0.174 -0.117 -0.146 -0.0966 0.669* 0.760** 0.702** 0.792**  
(0.190) (0.207) (0.190) (0.209) (0.346) (0.369) (0.351) (0.373) 
Rule of law 0.278 0.206 0.247 0.191 0.603* 0.641** 0.622** 0.659**  
(0.194) (0.210) (0.195) (0.211) (0.308) (0.318) (0.310) (0.320) 
Quality of 
regulation 0.423*** 0.401** 0.426*** 0.399** -0.545** -0.569** -0.577** -0.602**  
(0.158) (0.171) (0.158) (0.171) (0.233) (0.250) (0.240) (0.256) 
Access to 
finance 
0.00175 0.00174 0.00145 0.00161 
-
0.00415*
* 
-
0.00539*
** 
-
0.00422*
* 
-
0.00544*
** 
  (0.00158) (0.00177) (0.00159) (0.00178) (0.00189) (0.00204) (0.00190) (0.00204) 
Gini coefficient   -0.0145  -0.0146   0.0315*  0.0321* 
   (0.0113)  (0.0113)   (0.0177)  (0.0178) 
Number of 
disputes telecom 
sector     -0.0869 -0.0498       
    (0.0614) (0.0692)       
Number of 
disputes water 
sector           -0.0238 -0.0260 
          (0.0404) (0.0417) 
Constant -91.61*** -89.87*** -93.89*** -91.12*** -19.26 -30.47* -21.22 -33.24** 
 (7.488) (8.700) (7.656) (8.873) (14.14) (15.64) (14.54) (16.27) 
             
Observations 977 821 977 821 334 308 334 308 
R-squared 0.465 0.454 0.466 0.455 0.352 0.367 0.353 0.368 
Number of 
countries 106 91 106 91 40 36 40 36 
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i See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) for an overview and Estache et al. (2013) and Schwartz et al. 
(2009) for a treatment of infrastructure’s effects on jobs and growth. 
ii Private participation in infrastructure can be treated as equivalent to public-private partnerships. 
iii Investment in this paper refers to the resources the project company commits to invest in facilities during 
the contract period. Investments can be either in new facilities or in the expansion and modernization of 
existing facilities. Data entry varies across sectors: For projects other than telecommunications and large 
energy utilities, the total cost of developing or expanding the facility during the contract period is entered 
as investment data during the year of financial closure (for which data are typically available). For 
telecommunications projects and some large energy utilities, annual investments on facility expansion and 
modernization are entered as investment data in the year of investment when information is publicly 
available. Investments are recorded in millions of US dollars in either the year of financial closure or the 
year of investment as indicated above. 
iv Previous literature has only used the number of calendar days to resolve a payment through courts from 
Djankov et al. (2007), but not PPI disputes specifically. 
v The latest study is Tewodaj (2013) that uses data up to 2008. 
vi Values over 10 percent are accepted in the common literature, due to the bi-dimensional nature (countries 
and time) of the panel data model. 
vii In the year 2011, Serbia had a GDP per capita US$9,687 and a freedom of corruption index of  35 while 
South Africa had a GDP per capita of US$9,830 and a freedom of corruption index of 45.  
viii In the year 2011, Buthan had a rule of law index of .12 and a GDP per capita of US$5,162, while Jordan 
had a rule of law index of .22 with a GDP per capita of US$5,268. 
ixIn the year 2011, Mexico and Turkey had a GDP per capita of US$12,813 and US$13,468, respectively, 
while their quality of regulation indexes were .34 and .42, respectively 
x We used the number of disputes in the last 10 years before the commitment in order to capture the 
countries’ reputation in this matter. 
xi For a robustness check, the authors have added the Gini coefficient as an explanatory variable, expecting 
that, when controlling for income inequality, the coefficient will become significant for water. However, it 
is still not significant. 
